towards a new pragmatics of cross- and intercultural criticism by Gunn, Giles
Multiculturalism, Mourning, and the Americas:
Towards a New Pragmatics of Cross- and Inter-
cultural Criticism
Giles Gunn
If the recent passage of the Columbus quincentennary has posed for us
any new questions, one of them surely has to do with the relationships
among the various cultures that Columbus's voyage, or rather our
reconstruction of its consequences, has bequeathed to us. For if Columbus's
voyage succeeded in producing anything other than a holocaust to native
peoples, it resulted in an explosion of new cultures in the Americas that has
now left us with an elaborate assemblage of societies and nations whose
relations with one another, however carefully documented in other terms,
are still comparatively unexplored in cultural terms. In other words, despite
the fact that these new nations and societies arose out of a common
experience of European settlement and colonization, an experience
involving not only tlle conquest, displacement, and near extermination of
almost the entire indigenous population, but also the domestication, often
with the assistance of enslaved Africans, of immense tracks of undeveloped
wildemess; and despite, further, the fact that the basis of virtually all of the
imaginative, and many of the discursive, arts in all of the countries of the
Americas would subsequently be fumished by the way these hybrid
American societies, composed of three different races, would eventually
undergo a revolutionary break with the colonizing power and then
inevitably need to reconstitute themselves as something self-consciously
different from their European parents -- despite these shared experiences
and interpretations of experience, no one would describe the comparative
study ofAmerican cultures as a thriving academic industry.
This is not to suggest that the cross-cultural relations among and
between the many societies and political formations of the Americas, both
North and South together with the Caribbean world, have in the past gone
unexamined. From the period of earliest contact between native and non-
native peoples to the present, these relations have been a source of the
profoundest interest in texts ranging from the Mayan "Books of Chilam
2Balam" and Bemal Diaz's The Conquest of a New Spain to Manuel Puig's
Betrayed by Rita Hayworth and Jamaica Kincaid's Lucy. And these works
ofprimary reflection have been supplemented in recent decades by a variety
of distinguished studies of secondary reflection that include everything from
Pablo Neruda's meditations on Walt Whitman, Octavio Paz's The Labyrinth
of Solitude, Jorge Luis Borges's Introduction to American Literature,
Roberto Femandez Retamar's Caliban and Other Essays, Edmund Wilson's
o Canada and Howard Mumford Jones's 0 Strange New World to Jose
Marti's essays on "Our America," V. S. Naipaul's ruminations on "Our
Universal Civilization, Juan Goytisolo's Realms of Strife, Tzetan Todorov's
The Conquest ofAmerica, and Carlos Fuentes's The Buried Mirror.
Yet for all of its intelligence and insight, this enormous body of
writing has not managed, at least in the United States, to do very much to
diminish, for all hut specialists, the general level of ignorance on these
matters. Few U.S. students of American history, politics, or literature, for
example, think that racial practices in the Carribean, or the appeal of
dictatorships in SOllth America, or environmental policies in the Canadian
provinces, or modemist aesthetic experimentation in Central America have
very much light to shed on their own subjects, and the development in the
United States, during the postwar era, of an interdisciplinary field spanning
the humanities and the social sciences and devoted to the examination of the
history of American culture, "past and present and as a whole," to quote a
famous formulation, known as "American Studies" has yet to de-
provincialize the word "American" in that title so that it may encompass all
of the New World societies that find some kind of interpretive shelter
beneath its umbrella.
One could, I suppose, attempt to explain this by resorting to a
reductionist argument which lays the responsibility for this ignorance at the
ideological door of, say, U.S. imperialism, or Western capitalism, or
institutional Eurocentrism, or even Spanish-American chauvinism, and no
small anlount of the scholarship that accompanied the quincentenary, at
least on the left, has been tempted to take such a simplistic line. But the
despite the genocidal horrors that the anniversary of Columbus's voyage has
brought home to us in the United States and elsewhere -- horrors whose
replication throughout the centuries and across so many of the emergent
cultures of the Americas encourage one to reach for the kinds of
explanation that link the structuration of socioeconomic as weIl as symbolic
3formations to fixed ideas about race and ethnicity -- there are surely other
reasons why the term "American," when employed as a hemispheric or
cOl1tinental designation, evokes for so many so minimum a sense of
solidarity.
No doubt one ofthem has to do with the entirely different grammar of
motives that fueled the original process of colonization in British as
opposed to Spanish America and the different effects that these motives
were to have on the way the societies they respectively generated dealt with
everything from native peoples and African slavery to the desire for
independence and the rise of nationalism. A second reason why the term
"American" is so difficult to bring into focus in a hemispheric or continental
context is that the cultures of the Americas, even where they border one
another, display enormous variations among themselves and, like most
cultures, are themselves anything but homogeneous or tightly integrated but
rather highly unstable fields in which distinct and often divisive, or at least
vigorously contested, processes -- social, economic, psychological,
political, ceremonial, and aesthetic -- intersect, when they intersect at all, at
strange angles. A third -- and for my purposes more interesting -- reason
for the referential incoherence of the word "American" as a term of
hemispheric designation -- and one of special significance to students of
literatlIre and ideas -- has to do with the extent to which all of its cultures
were initially the products, and continue to remain the products, of a
complicated process of rhetorical invention and reinvention.
As Edmundo O'Gorman was one of the first to teach us, America was
not discovered so much as invented, or, rather discovered as a result of its
invention, by Europeans less interested in determining the reality of New
World conditions in all their empirical distinctiveness than in reimagining
those conditions as forms of alterity in relation to which they as Europeans
might redefine themselves. This is not, of course, to claim that there was
nothing to be found on Friday, October 12, 1492, at around 2:00 A.M., when
Christopher Columbus made landfall in the West Indies on the island of
what is now called San Salvador; only that Colllmbus was mistaken about
what he had come upon that fateful moming, and that he then compounded
the problem by resisting the corrections of experience for the sake of using
the opportunity for misinterpreting the othemess of the circumstances that
4confronted hirn simply to reinforce and extend the image of hirnself and his
mission that he had brought with hirn.!
Looking for a sea passage to India, Columbus supposed that he had
actually managed to reach the Orient and then steadfastly refused to
relinquish this conviction despite three later voyages that at most never
carried hirn hIrther west than the Paria peninsula of Venezuela. Convinced
that he had landed on the shores of Asia because he viewed everything
before his eyes with amental pieture composed in unequal parts of
Ptolemaic geography, historical accounts of Marco Polo's journey, and the
Christian Bible, Columbus was not only unaware that instead he had come
upon on an altogether different landrnass (consequently leaving credit for
that discovery to be claimed by Amerigo Vespucci, another Italian
navigator, whose report of the achievement of alandfall in the Southern
hemisphere antedating Columbus's was itself most likely a fabrication) but
persisted in believing that by undertaking this expedition he was merely
fulfilling the injunctions of Holy Scripture: "In carrying out this Enterprise
of the Indies, neither reason nor mathematics nor maps were any use to me:
fully accomplished were the words ofIsaiah."
One might demur by saying that what was really accomplished was
the commencement of a history of astonishing and relentless
misinterpretation that continued with the misalliance between Columbus's
name and the idea ofNew World discovery as such, the title of America's
first discoverers belonging rather to the remote nomadic ancestors of those
singular and wondrous human specimens, as Columbus and Vespucci both
attested, even if they could not credit them with any real humanity, that
confronted them on the beaches of the Americas. All the more ironie,
indeed tragic, that despite the sophistication and heterogeneity of the
societies and cultllres which Native Americans had created in the New
World -- while some remained hunters and gatherers, others created written
languages, became expert at engineering and astronomy, mastered the arts
of mathematical calculation, and built such magnificent cities as Palenque,
Tikal, Tula, Monte Alban, Uxmal, Chiehen Itza, and Tenochititlan -- these
infinitely various peoples were summarily to be lumped together and thus
rendered indistinct by the name they received from Columbus hirnself when
he mistook their homeland for Asia and thus called them "Indians."
1 Some of the material in the next several pages has been drawn from my "Introduction" to Early
American Writing, erl. G·iles Gunn (New York: Penguin USA, 1994), pp. xv-xxi.
5Misinterpretations such as these, occurring at the very moment of the
process of so-called "discovery," tell us something of what it means to say
that America was invented as much as found. They tell us that from this
moment on the world that was to realize itself within the compass of the
word "America" was to be a world shaped as much by the energies of the
imagination as by the substance of the empirieal, as much by the
ambiguities of desire as by the structures of the actual. The world called
"America," both North and South, would ever after be a world determined
controlled by meanings as much as by facts, a world where fantasy,
fabrication, and fiction would dominate the question of the real and thus
define the nlany ofthe processes ofmaterial as weIl as symbolic creation.
The initial result of these processes of rhetorical invention was the
appearance of chronicles of discovery, conquest, and settlement that erased
pretty much the whole inventory of what we might, within these indigenous
cultures, call "local knowledge" for the sake of celebrating their own
interpretive triumph over such wisdom. But this process of narrative
triumphalism then left the descendants of these same chronicles with the
task of reinventing themselves all over again if they were to develop any
form ofNew World identity independent ofthe initial colonial stories. An
definitional process made still more complex when several of these post-
colonial Americas were to exhibit colonialist designs of their own, this
process of cultllral reinvention is now only being extended further as
contemporary scholars and interpreters attempt to bring the counter-colonial
texts produced in response to this process of cultural revisionism and
reinvention into some form of critical contact and comparison with one
another.
One can only hope, as Bell Gale Chevigny and Gari Laguardia have
observed so intelligently about this process of cultural hermeneutics, that
this last stage of cultural production can do something other than merely
add yet another layer of fabrication to the process; that it can initiate,
through comparative and other self-reflexive techniques, something like a
"mutual interrogation" which, in addition to revealing the diverse strategies
of representation differentiating this succession of colonial, post-colonial,
and neocolonial texts, can also possibly throw into critical relief some ofthe
inner assumptions of the divergent constitutive principles that are buried
6within them.2 What we need to leam is not simply how people sharing
similar rituals of self-creation could have come to inhabit such utterly
different social worlds but whether and in what sense, as Clifford Geertz
has written, they can still have "a genuine, and reciprocal, impact on one
another."3
One among the more understandable reasons why this impact is so
difficult to achieve is because the symbolic sedimentation of such
processes, and the cultural distinctions on which they depend, goes so deep.
However integral and often indispensable such differentiations are to the
organization of hunlan life as we know it historically, they derive much of
their power from what I hope it willoffend no one to call their status as
fictions. Cultural differentiations deserve to be called fictions at least in a
limited sense not only because they often tend, whenabsolutized as some
element of the cultural template, to presuppose a homogeneity or uniformity
of experience that their historical development actually belies, but also in
the sense that they derive much of their authority from assumptions that are,
among other things, decidedly aesthetic. This is not to argue that such
significations are any less real or legitimate -- or are experienced as being
any less real or legitimate -- because they are imaginative as weIl as
political or metaphoric as weIl as social and economic; it is merely to assert
that whatever the experiential terrain on which such artifacts, and the deep
attacllments they afford, are expressed, these same artifacts, and the
emotional appeals with which they are identified, are cultural before they
are anything else. They are forms by which people make sense of the sense
their experience makes to them, and make more valuable sense the more
that sense can be expressed in figurative forms, the more it can be rendered,
as it were, semiotic and tropological.
It is no accident, then, that Benedict Anderson chose to call his now
classic study of nations and nationalism by the title Imagined
Communities.4 His intention was to show that nations can be viewed as
imaginative in at least several different senses. In the first place, since no
single individual can possibly be acquainted with all, or even with a
majority, of the other individuals who belong to the national collectivity
2 Bell Gale Chevigny and Gari Laguardia, eds., Reinventin~ the Americas: Comparatiye Studies of
Literature in the United States and Spanish America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1986, p. vii.
3 Clifford Geertz, Local Knowled~e (New York: Basic Books, 1983), p. 161.
4 Benedict Anderson, Ima~inedCommunities
7they call their own, their sense of that collective formation thus lives in
consciousness only as an image of what none of them singly has ever
experienced. Second, no matter how large one's sense of that national
collectivity, it is always, in the minds of its citizens, delimited by
boundaries that are other than geographical but which can nowhere be fully
or adequately represented, even through the machinery of the law. Third,
because a sense of the limits of nationality is almost always accompanied
by a coincident, though not wholly supportable, belief in the sovereignty or
integrity of what those limits mark, that belief inevitably operates, in
Wallace Stevens's language, as a kind of "Supreme Fiction." And fourth, if
what, more than anything else, marks those limits is a sense of community
or solidarity--Anderson calls it "a deep, horizontal comradeship" -- that
sense of community or solidarity is feIt to be self-validating.
If such fictive elements such as these lend the notion of nationality an
enormous volatility and power, think of what they also do for such parallel
conception as those of ethnicity, race, gender, class, religion, and even
status. If, on the one side, they allow such notions to serve as instruments in
and through which groups may express an understandable desire and need
to honor and enact their own legacies of identity, on the other they so
quickly tend to "naturalize" the boundaries between peoples of different
nationalities, ethnicities, races, and so on as to make transit hetween or
across them seem at times all hut experientially impassible. But this only
raises all over again the question about whether it is feasible, or even
possible, to look for, or try to define, some common set of qualities or forms
of experience which all the peoples of the Americas may be said to share
and in relation to which some sort of public vocabulary might be
constructed where they could provide, as it were, a plausible representation
ofthemselves to one another. Even ifthose qualities or forms oflife are not
to be found, as the American poet William Carlos Williams once assumed,
in his In the American Grain they might he found, through interpretive acts
of archaeological excavation that lead one, as it were, beneath or behind
history altogether, into a region ofpure instinct and desire which, in its dark
mystery and unpredictable violence, matches qualities that Williams
associated with the primordial wildemess of the Americas itself, can they be
located and identified anywhere else?5
5 William Carlos Williams, In the American Grain (New York: New Directions, 1925).
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publically accessible, lie, for example, within history itself, say, in some
mythic framework from which all the culturally specific stories of the
Americas somehow narratively derive? Or might they instead be found, if
not in some genetic link between general myths of origin and specific
narratives of destiny, then in the connection between generic interpretive
possibilities and diverse interpretive practices in cultural traditions that still
remain differentiable? Or yet again, could they be found in the sorts of
crosslights that can be produced when differing ideational, emotional, and
ritual elements from distinctive historical traditions are brought into
apposite but meaningful relations with one another? Or, finally, might they
lie embedded within some text like, for instance, Machado de Asis's Epitaph
of a Small Winner, or Isabelle Allende's The House of Spirits; or some
figure, like Jose de San Martin, or the woman the Spanish called Dona
Marina and the Indians knew as La Malinche; or some territory such as the
Caribbean which may serve to bridge the differences between the Northem
and Southem hemisphere?
As it happens, each of these possibilities has recently been explored
witll some care in the various essays that make up a book like Gustavo
Perez Firmat's aptly titled, and very useful, Do the Americas Have a
Common Literature"?6 Just as many of the individual cultures of the
Americas share, for example, a common myth of genesis that is clearly
indebted to the Biblical depiction of Eden and the counter-image of
humanity's expulsion to an outer wildemess of llncertainty and strangeness,
so one can describe systematic relationships, let us say, between the
Hispanic understanding of the family and the North American, or between
the labyrinth of solitude in the Latin American literary soul and its echo in
the soul of North American writers like Poe, Hawthome, Melville, and
Dickinson. Or, again, just as one can see affinities between the career of a
Simon Bolivar and an Abraham Lincoln, or discem teIltale similarities and
differences between the history of miscegenation in Brazil and in the
antebellum South, so one can isolate figures like Gabriel Garcia Marquez
or, before hirn, Sor Juana who seem to absorb and express many of the
contradictions that make up at least some of the Americas at any given
moment; or, one can find a concept such as the mestizo that individuals as
various as the African American intellectual Albert Murray, the Nicaraguan
6 Gustavo Pirez Firmat, Do the Americans Have a Common Literature?
9poet Ruben Dario, and the Mexican graphic artist Jose Guadalupe Posada,
all view as characterizing the cultures, like the peoples, of both
hemispheres.
The question is whether such inquiries finally get us very far, or at
least as far as we now need to go in conceptualizing how, without
subordinating one of the cultures of the Americas to another, they may be
related critically. While it is true that common essences can be detected
beneath cultural differences, that sets of traits have been shared across
cultural boundaries, that cultural homologies can be discovered in the origin
and development as opposed to the appearance and function of otherwise
disparate social practices, and that representative figures may be found who
unify, or at least span, contiguous cultural traditions, these discoveries
merely disclose materials of experience that, for the most part, have yet to
be made visible to one another. In recent years our ability to bring such
differences into view has presumably been secured and enhanced by the
methods of the historian, the iconographer, the anthropologist, the literary
critic, the philosopher of ideas, the political scientist, the sociologist, and
the historian of religions and folklore. By the same token, our capacity to
place such differences in critical relations with one another so that the many
"Americas" they reflect or, better, refract can be dialectically engaged has
only just begun. Thus the real issue is not so much how to bring these things
into view as how to make them interpretively accessible and answerable to
one another; how to formulate their similarities and differences in a way
that might permit them to have a complementary, perhaps even a corrective,
influence on one another.
For this to be accomplished, we need an interpretive method that is not
only adept, as Clifford Geertz once put it, at translating the performances
and practices of one culture into the idioms of another but that is also
capable, as Renato Rosaldo has insisted, of rhetorically submitting the
cultural positioning of its own idioms and perspectives to the critique of the
performances and practices it would translate into them.7 This not only
requires replacing the notion of culture as a system of shared and stable
meanings with a view of cultllres as often composed of, and held together
by, a more fluid, irregular, and often contradictory, as Lionel Trilling called
it, "hum and buzz of implication"; it also entails an acknowledgment that
7 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Renato Rosaldo,
Culture and Truth: The Remakin~ of Social Analysis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989).
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the social analyst is not a tabula rasa but a positioned subject who must
realize, as Rosaldo puts it, "that the objects of social analysis are also
analyzing subjects whose perceptions must be taken nearly as seriously as
'we' take our own."8 Stated positively, this means that the student of culture
must follow the lead of theorists like Gloria Anzaldua who encourage the
exploration of cultural borderlands that surface not only at the boundaries of
officially recognized cultural units but also at less formal intersections, such
as those of gender, age, status, and distinctive life experiences, the site of
what within cultural studies is currently called the "multicultural
imaginary."9 In more negative terms, this means that the intersections of
the multicultural imaginary are neither self-evident nor self-interpreting,
and that, indeed, they can neither be read, nor for that matter even found, so
long as critics fail to submit their own methods to the potential critique of
the subject positions they intend to expose by their means.
Among several methods of critical inquiry capable of putting their
own epistemic authority at risk while at the same time attempting to turn
putative cultural differences into forms that can effectively address one
another, I know of none possibly more useful than the method known as
pragmatism. The pragmatism to which I refer is something rather different
from the philosophical theory originally created by Charles Sanders Peirce
and then developed in his own rather special manner hy William James's
first essays on the subject, the pragmatism which defined itself as, on the
one hand, a method of philosophical inquiry that associated the meaning of
ideas with the effects they are calculated to produce in experience and, on
the other, as a theory of truth which asserted that all beliefs, including
ultimate ones, are confirmed or disconfirmed by whether or not they PlIt us
in hetter touch with the rest of what we take our experience to be. In its
more contemporary and, I would now want to say, trans-national form,
elements of which can be found in Jurgen Habermas's theory of
communicative action, Michael Oakeshott's philosophy of discourse, and
Pierre Bourdieu's reflexive sociology as weIl as in Richard Rorty's
conception of edifying philosophy or Clifford Geertz's social and cultural
anthropology, pragmatism now presents itself more generally as a method
for making discriminations in a world without absolutes, or, to state it more
accurately, in a world where the "quest for certainty," as John Dewey put it
8 Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society (New York: Doubleday
AnchorBook, 1957), p. 200; Rosaldo, p. 207.
9 Gloria Anzaldua
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in the title of his Gifford lectures, has become too treacherous and too futile
to pursue. IO Specializing in determining the social and moral practices
generated by theories, this kind of pragmatism is less interested in reducing
all theories to a set of themes and then applying them in a variety of
different contexts -- all psychoanalysis is collapsed into the Lacanian
postulate that the llnconscious is structured like a language and then critics
set abot looking for linguistic structures in every unconscious trace; all of
Foucault is condensed into a theory of power and then critics set about
proving that there are no symbolic or epistemic structures that do not
attempt to subordinate one form of consciousness to another -- than in
trying to place their referents in the circumstances of their social and moral
significance. 11
Pragmatism thus offers itself, in Dewey's famous fonnulation in
Experience and Nature, a critique of prejudices. 12 The prejudices in
question are those ideas and values we cherish and idealize precisely
because they tend to stabilize and ground us in the face of life's
precariousness and uncertainty. The gods, after all, were born in fear, as
Dewey likes to point out, which is why we are always seeking to reify and
essentialize them. To criticize the gods or, in other terms, to examine
prejudices is thus to de-essentialize them, which we accomplish through
hermeneutic acts of "intellectual disrobing," as Dewey termed them,
designed to determine, on the one hand, what the garments of cultural
sense-making that we call prejudices or values do to those of us who put
them on and, on the other, to assess what the wearing ofthose garments of
cultural sense-making does to the values or prejudices themselves. 13
Without pretending that we can shed such garments entire and hence
recover in experience the fundamental innocence or primitive naivete of
living without them, Dewey fonnulated his own version of immanent
critique when he insisted that by an imaginative reconstruction and
intelligent analysis of the situations from which values arise and the
10 John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: G. P. Putnarn Sons, 1960).
11 See, for example, John McDermott, Strearns of Experience: Reflections on the History and
Philosophy of American Culture (Amberst, Ma.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1986),
Cornel West, The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1989), Richard J. Bernstein, The New Conste11ation: The Ethical-
Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity (Carrlbridge: MIT Press, 1992), and Giles Gunn,
Thinking Across the American Grain: Ideology, Inte11ect, and the New Pragmatism (Chicago:
University ofChicago Press, 1992).
12 John Dewey, Experience and Nature (LaSalle, 111.: Open Court, 1929), p. 35.
13lbid.
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consequences In which they issue, we can recover what he termed a
secondary naivete or cultivated innocence. Otherwise known as the
"discipline of severe thought," Dewey believed thast this method of critical
inquiry holds the key not only to the criticism of cultural forms but to the
furtherance of culture as a whole. Only by emancipating and expanding the
meanings of which experience is capable, Dewey maintained, can culture
advance; and only by critically assessing the valuatons of which cultural
experience is composed can the meanings potential to it, but not yet
effectively realized within it, be successfully liberated.
Problems arise for this theory, as they do for so many others, not
simply because people seem to prefer their own values to the values of
others bllt because they seem to be able to maintain their own values only at
the expense of disparaging and often demonizing the values of others. To
put this somewhat differently, questions of cultural identity seem so often
locked in such destructive embrace with issues of cultural difference. The
political theorist William E. Connolly has recently explained this by arguing
that identity, whether personal or cultural, can only establish itself
paradoxically in relation to a set of differences that it is constantly tempted
view not simply as other and but also often as inimical. This moral reflex,
by which we create and defend our own identity only at the expense of
deprecating the identity of others, no doubt reaches its apogee in the
virtually universal practice of scapegoating in which, as Kenneth Burke
long ago reminded us, we continuously transform others into sacrificial
objects for the ritual unburdening of our own unwanted vices and phobias.
Connolly maintains that such practices, and the contribution they make to
wllat he calls "the dogmatization of identity," can only be resisted, even if
never entirely reversed, through the development of modes of reflection that
investigate what he calls a new "ethicality" that expresses itself in the "care
for difference." 14
Pragmatism's ethical interest in the nurturing of difference can be seen
in the way it serves as an antidote to its dogmatization. As with all good
therapies, pragmatism seeks to combat the effects of the disease by
ministering to its cause. Assuming that the cause of this process of
dogmatization lies in the threat of the loss of identity, or, rather, threat of
the loss of those portions of the past that permit identity to be constructed in
14 William E. Connolly, IdentitylDifference: Democratic Ne~otiations of Political Paradox (Ithaca:
Comell University Press, 1991), p. 212ff.
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relation to a self-serving dialectic of sameness and difference, pragmatism
is to be associated with those interpretive strategies which, like
psychoanalysis, cultivate what the cultllral psychologist Peter Homans calls
"the ability to moum."15
To link psychoanalytic therapy and pragmatist inquiry to the work of
mouming is not only to side with Freud in his eventual refusal to restrict the
process of mouming to the selfs recurrent experience of the loss of loved
persons and objects and extend the process of mOllming to include as weIl
the disappearance or disintegration of valued meanings and ideals; it is also
to assurne that the process of cultural as opposed to personal mouming is
blocked when the self responds to such losses, or to their anticipation, by, as
it typically does, attempting to recreate itself in the image of some aspect of
the past that it fears may be lost to it but which the self believes can remain
effectively present and thus available to it when that element of the past is
imaginatively reified as some form of cultllral alterity which reinforces
identity by diabolizing, or at least deprecating, difference. Mouming is thus
associated both by pragmatism and by psychoanalysis with the process,
largely interpretive, whereby the self leams how to shed itself of these self-
protective, often narcissistic attachments, not by abandoning the meaningful
historical past altogether, but by relinquishing the attempt to compensate for
the continual need to revise outwom structurations of the relation between
subjectivity and the social surround -- be they ethnic, social, racial,
religious, sexual, or nationalistic -- by absolutizing some essentially
oppositional version of them as an adequate model for negotiating the
relations between self and other. 16
The relations between mouming and the formation of cultural identity
might be thought of another way as a crisis of representation and its
possible resoilltion. This crisis of representation is precipitated, one might
say, by the initial movement of mouming itself, a movement which records,
in addition to the abjection of a self that has suffered the loss of an object in
some sense determinative of its own sense of presence and empowerment,
the consequent negation of the selfs ability to compensate for such loss
except by creating and then valorizing a representation of its own
experience of it. The crisis is in tum resolved only when the work of
15 Peter Romans, The Ability to Moum: Disillusionment and the Social Origins of Psychoanalysis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989).
16 This process is discussed at greater length and linked to the genealogy pragmatism and
psychoanalysis share in Gunn, Thinkinf: Across the American Grain, pp. 12-16.
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mourning succeeds in dissociating the self from its fixation on a
representation that merely memorializes its own experience of its loss so
that the self can commence to reconstruct in its place a representation or
narrative that memorializes instead the object that occasioned its sense of
loss, and in a form that can eventually be contemplated and enjoyed rather
simply suffered and endured.
Gathering up hints from Freud, Lacan, and Melanie Klein, the
American literary historian Mitchell Breitwiesser has deftly shifted the
description of this arduous process into a more psychoanalytic register by
depicting it as one where the initial image, or, better, sense, of what has
been lost to the self, and thus of what has been lost of the self, is
subsequently challenged by a resurgence of memories that mark the passage
ofthe deceased's life through the mourner's world. Threatening what Lacan
calls a "second death," this surge of memory begs to be blocked by the
nearest mechanism at hand, a mechanism which turns out, as previously
noted, to be a defense of that initial image which the mourner had
constructed of his or her own feIt sense of IOSS.17 Promising to immunize
both the mourner and the mourned against further encroachments of the
experience of death -- and thus to help reverse the mourner's sense of
impotence in the face of the loss of his or her object of attachment -- this
defensive strategy nonetheless carries with it an additional risk. This is the
risk of creating within the self what Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok
have termed a "crypt," or inert area, which then obstructs the return of
further memories and permanently blocks the continued work of mourning.
To remove these impediments, and the fantasies of spurious
empowerment that accompany them, requires the recovery of those
resurgent memories so that the self can eventually reconstruct a different
representation of the deceased that is this time based not on the selfs
experience of its own loss but on what Lacan calls "the unique value/valor
ofthe dead's being."18 In other words, without areturn ofthe repressed (in
this case, the memories of the diseased), the self cannot construct out of,
and for, the imagination a representation ofthe passage that the diseased has
made through its own world, much less one that is distinguishable from the
selfs image of its own griefe Hence the work of mourning is thwarted if the
17 Mitchell Breitwiesser, American Puritanisnl and the Defense of Mouming: Religion, Grief, and
Ethnology in Mary Rowlandson's Captivity Narrative (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1990), p. 302.
18 Quoted, Breitwiesser, p. 325.
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dead is not allowed, as Breitwiesser aptly observes, to die "honorably, that
is, adequately assigned to being somethillg symbolized" as opposed to
remalnlng "a crippling defect in a survivor who would otherwise be
whole."19
If· honoring the dead, in psychoanalytic terms, is dependent on the
technique of transference, the technique of transference, as post-Lacanian
psychoanalysis has emphasized, is none other than a method of
interpretation. Bearing a striking resemblance to what might otherwise be
described as a pragmatist theory of criticism, transference creates what
Freud viewed as a region situated somewhere between illness and real life
where the patient's blockage, now manifested in a symbolic reification
centered on the patient's grief rather than on the meaning of his or her loss,
can become accessible to the interpretive interventions and reinterpretations
of the analyst. Transference thus turns the therapeutic relationship into an
interpretive exchange where the story to be reconstructed is a product of the
transactions between analyst and analysand as each contributes -- because
of, and in anticipation of, the interventions of the other -- to the production
of a new, or at any rate an altered, narrative.
This is a narrative whose veracity, as in William James's theory of
truth, has less to do with its correspondence with buried fact, with a reality
that is reflected or copied, and more to do with its plausibility as the model
for an alternative future. As in literary interpretation generally, the meaning
produced by this narrative is neither alone a result of the author's intentions
nor of the reader's responses but rather a consequence of their collaborative
and critical interaction. The aim of the therapeutic exercise is thus to create
an interpretive environment where, in clinical terms, both patient and
therapist and, in aesthetic terms, both artist and critic, may work on a "text"
that simultaneously "works" on them in the beliefthat the fullest measure of
so-called truth, to utilize Peter Brook's helpful formulation, will be found
through the deepest possible penetration of the semiotic, the imaginative,
and the hermeneutic into the domain ofthe psychological.20
But if the process of transference is central to the psychodynamic
proces·s of individual therapy, where it exhibits its analogies with the work
of reading, may it not also possess a similar, if somewhat less readily
distinguishable, function in the psychosocial process of cultural therapy,
19 Breitwiesser, p. 41.
20 Peter Brooks, "The Proffered Word," Times Literary SUl1111ement, Nov. 9, 1991, pp. 11-12.
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where it exhibits albeit looser analogies with the work of criticism. The
point to be noted is that recovery ofthe selfs ability to create and enjoy new
meanings, which is synonymous with the work of mouming itself, is made
possible only by a liberation of the selfs capacities for imaginative as weIl
as interpretive reflection. Thus the work of mouming thus eventuates both
for pragmatism and for psychoanalysis in the development of a new
emotional and intellectual space that exists, as it were, between the self and
the social order. An intermediate space that enables the self through
symbols to fashion its relations with structures of meaning that it inherits
and at the same time, in the process of appropriating them, recreates, this is
the cultural space that until the end of his life, as Homans points out, Freud
had trouble conceiving, and then could imagine only at the risk of
mythically essentializing it, but that pragmatism necessarily presupposes
and critically seeks to colonize without conceptually defining.
More specifically, this cultural space for the recreation of the self is
the region that James brought into view by his pragmatic association of the
meaning of ideas with outcomes merely anticipated and consequences only
projected and that Dewey delineated by reinscribing critical inquiry at the
imaginative intersection of causes that ultimately can only be inferred and
results that finally can merely be divined. An at least partially fictive space
created in no small measure by fantasy, conjecture, inference, hypothesis,
surmise, and prediction, this domain is not only where, as James and Dewey
maintained, though not always with consistency, that our most fateful (and
fanciful) reasoning occurs bllt also the realm where societies like selves
must, with the help of the intepreters of their own and others' traditions,
continuously leam how, in relation to one another, to redescribe and thus
reconceive themselves. If this interpretive process, often conducted
simultaneously but assymetrically on multiple levels of cultural
understanding and experience, is endlessly complex, fragmentary,
provisional, and haphazard, it is no less indispensible to the possibility of
cultural change.
This is as much as to say that if selves, as Jamesian and, more
emphatically, Deweyan pragmatism has always insisted, develop only in
relation to other selves, the same holds true for cultures. But if cultures
constitute themselves, as Christopher Miller has again pointed out, "by
reference to each other," this intercultural referentiality can, and does, cut in
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more than one direction.21 If cultures can, as we are now prepared to
acknowledge, only find out how they might become other than they are by
imaginatively placing in the narratives and fables of others, so it is also, as
Carlos Fuentes has recently noted, only by discovering ourselves already in
some sense situated in those narratives, often as their demonized other, that
'we can even begin to leam who we presently are. The stories, narratives,
histories, and representations of the other Americas thus not only permit us
to begin reimagining and refashioning ollrselves; they also enable us to
recognize aspects, dimensions, and potentialities of ourselves that we did
not even know were present in us, or at least possibilities for us, all along.22
We thus retllm to where we began but this time found in translation
rather than lost in it. To find oneself in the processes of cross- and inter-
cultural translation is to realize that our relations with others, and
particularly with socially and culturally significant others, are rarely direct
or transparent. Occurring most often in that intermediary space between
selves and the social surollnd, those exchanges occur through the mediation
of symbols and narratives that have become consequential for us both in
oddly similar ways: not because they possess the same significance in our
different cultural-historical contexts, but because they have served -- and
can be comprehended as having served -- the same, or at any rate similar,
functions in our respective moral development. Thus what we usually
identify with through these mediations are the psycho-cultural processes by
which other people, often so different from us in many other respects, have
become more interesting, and sometimes more admirable, but in any case
more instructive, for us through their ability to redraw the relations between
identity and difference in a way that does not define one at the expense of
the other; by, to state it another way, converting the temptation to lament
the loss of previous forms of cultural identity into an opportunity to create
new alternatives for personal and collective experience out of the
imaginative and interpretive energies brought into play through the
dissolution or wearing out of former ones. What, on the other hand, we
sometimes rather miraculously achieve through such symbolic interventions
is that fuller enlargement of ourselves that comes from recognizing, in
terms and forms often so alien and even unsettling to us, traces of that
21 Christopher Miller quoted, John Guillory, Cultural Capital: The Problem of Literary Canon
Formation (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1993), p. 53.
22 Carlos Fuentes, Myself With Others: Selected Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
1988).
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common and unending imaginative struggle for meaning that not only still
marks us all as human but still marks our humanity as necessarily a
corporate rather than an individual accomplishment. The possibility of
creating a mutually interrogative and genuinely dialogical cultural criticism
ofthe Americas depends on recognition ofthis double truth.
